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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is an in-depth examination of section 709 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Section 709, which was enacted in 1976, prescribed
rules for the treatment of organization expenses and syndication ex-
penses of a partnership.
Cases and commentary from three different time periods, as well
as the legislative history and regulations, will be analyzed. The first
area of emphasis is the pre-1976 case law on organization expenses and
syndication expenses. The cases examined in this section included
corporate cases that laid the foundation for the treatment of organiza-
tion expenses and syndication expenses, the first partnership cases
that dealt with the subject, and the Revenue Ruling and Tax Court
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decisions that were cited by the authors of section 709 in its legislative
history. The next area of emphasis will be cases that were decided
after section 709 was enacted, but dealt with transactions originating
prior to the section's effective date. The final body of case law that
will be examined in this Article are those cases that have applied sec-
tion 709.
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it is meant to be a
comprehensive survey of cases and commentary on the treatment of
partnership organization expenses and syndication expenses. Second,
it is meant to be a practical guide as to what expenses are deductible
and what expenses are not deductible. To this end, planning ideas will
be highlighted and areas of controversy will be explored. The theory
and foundation of section 709 will be fully examined in order to deter-
mine the direction that the application of the section may be heading.
II. CASE LAW PRIOR TO SECTION 709
A. Historical Treatment of Organization and Syndication Expenses
The first cases on the treatment of organization expenses dealt
with corporations.1 The Board of Tax Appeals, in Holeproof Hosiery
Co. v. Commissioner,2 held that expenditures made for the acquisition
of capital assets represent the cost of the acquired asset. In Holeproof
Hosiery, attorney's fees incurred in connection with an increase in
capitalization of the company were deemed to be capital in nature and,
therefore, not deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense.3 Cit-
ing Holeproof Hosiery, the court in Bush Terminal Building Co. v.
Commissioner,4 held that expenses in connection with the reorganiza-
tion of the petitioner's corporation must be capitalized. The court
stated that it has long been held that expenses of organizing or reorga-
nizing a business are capital expenditures that are not deductible as
business expenses. 5
1. In a series of cases the courts stressed that costs incurred in the organization of a
corporation must be capitalized rather than deducted. See, e.g., Fireman's Ins. Co.
v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1004, 1013-14 (1934); Commercial Inv. Trust Corp. v.
Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 143, 148 (1933); Malta Temple Ass'n v. Commissioner, 16
B.T.A. 409, 411 (1929); Grain King Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 793, 796
(1928); Holeproof Hosiery v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 547, 556 (1928).
2. 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928).
3. Id at 556.
4. 7 T.C. 793 (1946).
5. Id. at 819. See also Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 910 (1951), rev'd on
other grounds, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953). In Mills Estate the court recognized
that costs incurred in organizing and re-organizing a corporation, altering its capi-
tal structure, selling and disposing a stock issue, or acquiring and retiring out-
standing stock are treated as capital expenditures, rather than as ordinary and
necessary business expenses deductible from current income. Id. at 914.
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In two cases, Wolkowitz v. Commissioner,6 and Meldrum & Few-
smith, Inc. v. Commissioner,7 the Tax Court dealt with the issue of
organization expenses of a partnership. In Wolkowitz, petitioner was
a shareholder in a corporation that manufactured leather clothing.
The corporation was dissolved, and the shareholders and several
others formed a partnership to carry on the same business. On its
partnership tax return for its first year of existence, the partnership
deducted legal fees incurred as a result of the switch from corporate to
partnership form. The Tax Court, citing Bush Terminal for the prop-
osition that organization expenses of a corporation are non-deductible
capital expenses, held that organization expenses of a partnership are
also non-deductible. The court stated that organization expenses are
assets of a permanent nature and, therefore, represent property that
should be capitalized.8
In Meldrum & Fewsmith, petitioner was a partnership that had
been formed from a pre-existing corporation because of the corpora-
tion's inability to maintain adequate working capital. The sharehold-
ers became partners, and the corporation leased its equipment to the
partnership in order for the partnership to conduct business opera-
tions. The partnership retained a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
to determine the advisability of a change in the accounting period of
the business, and to analyze and compare the income tax liability of
the business under both the corporate and partnership forms of organ-
ization. An attorney was retained to determine a solution to the work-
ing capital problems of the business, to draft a pension plan, and to
draft documents in connection with the organization of the
partnership.
The Tax Court held that expenses incurred determining the advis-
ability of a change in organization form and accounting period were
deductible,9 as were expenses relating to the pension plan and credit
problems of the business.O However, citing Mills Estate v. Commis-
sioner,'" the court held that the remaining portion of the attorney's
fee, relating to the organization of the partnership, must be classified
as a capital expense.' 2
From these cases it is apparent that organization expenses are to be
capitalized and are not currently deductible. Also, no amortization
similar to that which is provided for corporations in section 248 would
be available to the partnership unless a useful life could be established
6. 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 754 (1949).
7. 20 T.C. 790 (1952).
8. Wolkowitz v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 754, 772 (1949).
9. Meldrum & Fewsmith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 790, 807 (1952) (citing
Parker v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 974 (1946)).
10. Id at 807.
11. 17 T.C. 910 (1951), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953).
12. Meldrum & Fewsmith v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 790, 807 (1952).
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for the intangible asset created by the organization of the partnership.
Wolkowitz established that organization expenses are to be considered
permanent in nature and would have value to the partnership over the
life of the partnership. Since most partnerships are assumed to have
an indefinite life unless otherwise provided,' 3 amortization of organi-
zation expenses would only be available to those partnerships estab-
lished for a limited purpose and for a certain number of years.
In 1954, section 248 was adopted as part of the Internal Revenue
Code.'4 This section provides an election for amortization of the or-
ganization expenses of a corporation over a period of not less than
sixty months.' 5 There was no comparable provision under the 1939
Code.
The legislative history of section 248 shows that Congress recog-
nized that, under the then existing law, organization expenses could
only be amortized if the corporation had a limited existence specified
in the corporate charter. 16 The Conference Committee noted that
since most corporations are perpetual, a vast majority of corporations
recovered their organization expenses for tax purposes only in the
year of liquidation. 17 The Conference Committee report excluded ex-
penses incurred in connection with stock issues and costs of reorgani-
zation from section 248 treatment.' 8
With the advent of section 248 in 1954, corporations received a de-
cided tax advantage over partnerships. A corporation could amortize
its capitalized organization expenses, while no similar provision was
available to partnerships. The authors of a leading treatise on part-
nership taxation contend, however, that the case law requirement of
capitalization of organization expenses was largely ignored by taxpay-
ers.19 The authors suggest that the organization expenses were often
deducted as legal or accounting fees, and these deductions were never
challenged by the Internal Revenue Service (Service). 20
As has been previously shown, other partnerships avoided the capi-
talization requirement by reimbursing partners who paid the organi-
zation expenses. Those payments were then deducted by the
13. Most real estate limited partnerships will have a limited life. Partnerships
formed to carry on a trade or business, and not formed for investment purposes,
would more than likely have an unlimited life.
14. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 248, 68A Stat. 1, 76 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 248 (1982)).
15. I.R.C. § 248(a) (CCH 1985).
16. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5280.
17. I&
18. Id,
19. 1 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 21.01 at
21-2 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as PARTNERSHIP TAXATION].
20. Id
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partnership as section 707(c) guarantee payments. Some practitioners
contended that under pre-1976 section 707(c), those payments were au-
tomatically deductible by virtue of their being guaranteed payments,
and that the underlying expense that was reimbursed did not need to
be examined.21
Although there were case law prohibitions against deduction of or-
ganization expenses, in practice these deductions were seldom chal-
lenged. This contention is supported by the fact that relatively few
cases addressed the subject of organizational expenses during the pe-
riod between the Wolkowitz and Meldrum & Fewsmith decisions in
the late 1940's and early 1950's, and Cagle v. Commissioner,22 in 1975.
This lack of case law can be interpreted in two ways. Either taxpayers
were not trying to deduct organization expenses or the Service was not
aggressively pursuing the issue. In either case, following the Cagle de-
cision and the enactment of section 709 in the 1970's, more cases were
decided dealing with the subject of the deductibility of organization
expenses and syndication expenses.
B. The Historical Foundation of Section 709
In November, 1974, the Tax Court decided Cagle v. Commis-
sioner.23 This opinion, which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, 24 was one of two authorities cited by the House and Senate
when section 709 was adopted.25 Cagle held that a guaranteed pay-
ment made to a general partner was non-deductible by the partner-
ship because the expenses incurred were capital in nature rather than
ordinary and necessary business expenses.
In Cagle, the appellants were practicing physicians who entered
into a partnership, the purpose of which was to "'construct, aquire by
purchase, own, hold, deal in, mortgage, operate, manage, equip, lease,
sell, exchange, transfer or in any manner dispose of warehouses, office
buildings, and other commercial property, and to do and perform all
things necessary or incidental or connected with or growing out of
such business.' ",26 Pursuant to this arrangement, the partnership de-
veloped an 80,000 square foot office showroom. The general partner
contributed the land and the investor partners contributed $200,000
each. All expenses flowed through to the investor partners pro rata.
The partnership also entered into a management contract with the
21. 1 W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS % 4.08[1], at 4-37 (1977).
22. 63 T.C. 86 (1974), affd, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976).
23. Id.
24. Id
25. See infra notes 41-42.
26. Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Articles of Part-
nership, Trial Record at 34).
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general partner.27 Work commenced on the building in 1968, and
there was no income producing structure until the summer of 1969.
The partnership's first tax return listed no income but reported ex-
penses of $105,973.
The sole issue before both the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit was
whether a management fee paid to a general partner was deductible
business expense under section 707(c), or a non-deductible section
263(a) capital expenditure. The Fifth Circuit interpreted section
707(c) as intending to permit partnerships to pay partners in the form
of guaranteed payments, with such payments being treated as ordi-
nary income to the partner and deductible to the partnership only if
the payment fell within section 61(a) or 162(a).28 The court stated
that this interpretation of section 707(c) did not support the partner-
ship's contention that guaranteed payments are automatically deducti-
ble when paid by the partnership to a partner.2 9 The court further
stated that it was improbable that Congress intended to make capital
expenditures of a partnership deductible if paid to a partner, but not if
paid to a non-partner.30
The court held that none of the fees expended by the management
company were for the actual management of the finished product. In-
stead, the fees expended were actually expenses incurred in the devel-
opment of the project. As such, the court held that these expenditures
of the partnership must be capitalized in view of consistent holdings
that expenditures for the acquisition of the capital assets of other enti-
ties are capital in nature.3 1
Soon after the Tax Court's decision in Cagle, the Service issued
Revenue Ruling 75-214.32 A limited partnership had been formed to
27. Services provided by the general partner under the management contract in-
cluded conducting a feasibility study, working with the general contractor and
architects on construction of the building, and arrangement of financing. Id. at
512. No part of the fee paid to the general partner in compensation for these
services was for management after completion of the building. Id
28. Id at 414.
29. The partnership had argued that § 707(c) results in deductibility regardless of the
nature of the services performed or capital used if the payment involved was
made without regard to partnership income. Id at 413.
30. The partnership cited Rev. Rul. 69-186, 1969-1 C.B. 185, as being persuasive. The
Revenue Ruling stated that "a guarantee payment is includible in the gross in-
come of the recipient as ordinary income and is deductible by the partnership
from its ordinary income as a business expense." Id The court stated that while
this language was persuasive standing alone, this interpretation did not seem rea-
sonable in light of congressional action. Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409, 414
(5th Cir. 1976).
31. Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976). In support of the main
proposition see, e.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974); Acer
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1942); Perlmutter v. Commis-
sioner, 44 T.C. 382 (1965).
32. 1975-1 C.B. 185.
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acquire, sell, and develop real estate. The general partner was to pay
the costs of organization and syndication. Immediately after the last
share was sold, the general partner was paid a specified amount. The
Service held that even though payments to general partners for serv-
ices rendered in organizing a partnership are section 707 payments,
they are not deductible under section 162(a) because they constitute
capital expenditures under section 263(a). The Service stated that the
threshold question was whether the expenditure is deductible under
section 162(a), and not whether the payment was made to a partner or
non-partner.
The Cagle decision and the Revenue Ruling, coupled with the case
law examined earlier, cast considerable doubt on the deductibility of
organization and syndication expenses of a partnership. In 1976, Con-
gress strengthened these decisions by adopting section 709 and revis-
ing section 707(c). Section 709 effectively closed the door on the
manipulation of organization and syndication expenses that had been
occuring since Meldrum & Fewsmith; however, section 709 was effec-
tive only for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1976.33 In
specifically barring current deductions for years beginning after 1976,
the Conference Committee stated that no inferences should be drawn
as to the deductibility of organization and syndication expenses in-
curred in years prior to 1976.34 Therefore, a post-709 "twilight zone"
was created in which tax disputes relating to pre-709 law were liti-
gated following the passage of section 709. In the cases decided after
the enactment of section 709 that dealt with tax years prior to 1976,
the courts could not allow amortization of organization expenses as
provided in section 709(b). Based on the Cagle decision, those ex-
penses would be capitalized with no allowable tax recovery.35
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 709
Section 70936 was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Tax
33. The § 709(a) non-current deduction provision applies to partnership tax years be-
ginning after December 31, 1975. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-1(a) (1983). The § 709(b)
amortization provision applies to organization expenses paid or incurred for part-
nership tax years after December 31, 1976. Id at § 1.709-1(b).
34. H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1421, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, 4118, 4132.
35. In Gaines v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 363 (1982), the petitioner argued
that § 709 should be applied prospectively, closing a loophole that existed prior to
its enactment. Since the tax years in question were pre-1976, the petitioner ar-
gued that the old rules should govern, and the deduction should be allowed. The
Tax Court examined the legislative history and determined that Congress did not
view the prior law as permitting the deductions claimed by the petitioner. Id- at
371-73.
36. I.R.C. § 709 (CCH 1985) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE.- Except as provided in subsection (b), no deduc-
tion shall be allowed under this chapter to the partnership or to any
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Reform Act of 1976.37 Section 709 provides that organization and syn-
dication expenses of a partnership are non-deductible.38 For organiza-
tion expenses, section 709(b) provides for an election to amortize the
expenses over a period of not less than sixty months.39 The original
text of the Tax Reform Act did not contain the sixty month amortiza-
tion of organization expenses provision.40 This provision was added by
the Senate4l and adopted by the House-Senate Conference
Committee.42
The legislative history of section 709 reflects the examination of
the current state of the law conducted by the Ways and Means Com-
mittee and the Senate Finance Committee prior to defining their rea-
sons for change. Prior to 1976, partnerships deducted payments made
to partners in connection with the organization of a partnership under
section 707(c).43 These "guaranteed payments" are deductible by the
partner for any amounts paid or incurred to organize a partnership or to
promote the sale of (or to sell) an interest in such partnership.
(b) AMORTIZATION OF ORGANIZATION FEES.-
(1) DEDUCTION.- Amounts paid or incurred to organize a partnership
may, at the election of the partnership (made in accordance with regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary), be treated as deferred expenses. Such
deferred expenses shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over such pe-
riod of not less than 60 months as may be selected by the partnership
(beginning with the month in which the partnership begins business), or
if the partnership is liquidated before the end of such 60-month period,
such deferred expenses (to the extent not deducted under this section)
may be deducted to the extent provided in section 165.
(2) ORGANIZATIONAL EXPENSES DEFINED.- The organizational
expenses to which paragraph (1) applies, are expenditures which-
(A) are incident to the creation of the partnership;
(B) are chargeable to capital account; and
(C) are of a character which, if expcnded incident to the creation of a
partnership having an ascertainable life, would be amortized over such
life.
37. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1547 (1976).
38. I.R.C. § 709(a) (CCH 1985).
39. Id. at § 709(b)(1).
40. H.R. REP. No. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975). The House Report states that
the interpretation given in Revenue Ruling 75-214 and in Cagle v. Commissioner,
63 T.C. 85 (1974), disallowing deductions for organization expenses, was correct.
The Report stated that "a contrary conclusion would allow partnerships to obtain
current deductions for capital expenditures (including organization expenses and
the expense of selling partnership interests), even though all other types of tax-
payers would be required to capitalize the same or similar expenses." H.R. REP.
No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess 121 (1976).
41. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 94, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3531.
42. H.R. REP. NO. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1421, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD NEws, 4118, 4132.
43. I.R.C. § 707(c) (1970), provided:
(c) GUARANTEED PAYMENTS.- To the extent determined without
regard to the income of the partnership, payments to a partner for serv-
ices or the use of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a
[Vol. 65:385
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partnership to the extent the payments are determined without re-
gard to the income of the partnership. A partner would be paid for
services rendered in organizing the partnership, and be reimbursed for
organizational expenditures made on behalf of the partnership. Tax-
payers cited legislative history44 and the regulations for section
707(c) 45 in support of this practice.46
member of the partnership, but only for the purposes of section 61(a)
(relating to gross income) and section 162(a) (relating to trade or busi-
ness expenses).
For current version of § 707(c), see infra note 51.
44. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954):
A partner who renders services to the partnership for a fixed salary, pay-
able without regard to the partnership income, shall be treated to the
extent of such amount, as one who is not a partner, and the partnership
shall be allowed a deduction for a business expense.
Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
45. See Treas. Regs. § 1.707-1(c) (1956), which provided in part:
(c) GUARANTEED PAYMENTS.- Payments made by a partnership to
a partner for services or for the use of capital are considered as made to a
person who is not a partner, to the extent such payments are determined
without regard to the income of the partnership. However, a partner
must include such payments as ordinary income for his taxable year
within or with which ends the partnership taxable year in which the
partnership deducted such payments as paid or accrued under its method
of accounting. See section 706(a) and paragraph (a) of § 1.706-1. Guaran-
teed payments are considered as made to one who is not a member of the
partnership, only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross in-
come) and section 162(a) (relating to trade or business expenses).
46. The Tax Court in Cagle v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 86 (1974), affd., 539 F.2d 409
(5th Cir. 1976), commented on the argument that the § 707(c) legislative history
provided for automatic deductibility of guaranteed payments. The court stated
that § 707 was enacted to end the contradiction and confusion surrounding the
tax treatment of partnerships that existed prior to enactment of the 1954 Code.
Congress determined the aggregate approach to be "unrealistic and unnecessarily
complicated," S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 387 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWs 4725, and adopted the entity approach for tax treatment
of compensation to partnerships. The court believed that implicit in the code as
enacted is the premise that payment to a partner for services will be viewed as
being made at the partnership level rather than at the partner level, and that the
character of the payment must also be viewed at the partnership level to deter-
mine its proper tax treatment. Employing the entity approach, a guaranteed pay-
ment is treated as being made to one who is not a member of the partnership,
rather than as a payment received in part from profits, other partners, and from
the receiving partner. Cagle v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 86, 94 (1974). For a defini-
tion and discussion of the aggregate and entity concepts, see 1 PARTNERSHIP TAX-
ATION, supra note 19, at §§ 2.06 & 2.07.
The Cagle court was faced with a question of first impression. The court
stated that § 707(c) clearly did not require automatic deduction of guaranteed
payments. The court concluded that such payments may qualify as a § 162(a)
expense, since § 707(c) employs the entity theory. The court added that congres-
sional intent requires inclusion of, and testing the deductibility of, partnership
guaranteed payments in a manner similar to the treatment of guaranteed pay-
ments made by other recognized taxable entities because of the simplicity of that
1986]
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The Cagle decision and a 1975 Revenue Ruling47 changed the inter-
pretation of section 707(c), by concluding that guaranteed payments
were not automatically deductible. The case and ruling required that
an inquiry be made into whether the service performed was ordinary
and necessary 48 or whether it was capital in nature.49 Thus, these de-
cisions closed a loophole that would have allowed current deductions
to partnerships for capital expenditures, while denying the same de-
ductions to individuals and corporations for similar expenses. 50
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress made a two-pronged at-
tack against the deduction of capital expenditures by partnerships
through the use of guaranteed payments. First, section 707(c) was
amended to make deductibility of guaranteed payments subject to the
section 263 capital expenditures provisions.51 Second, section 709 was
added, specifically denying a current deduction for all partnership or-
ganization and syndication expenses. In adding these provisions, both
the House and Senate agreed with the interpretation given to section
707(c) by the Tax Court in Cagle and the Internal Revenue Service in
Revenue Ruling 75-214.52 The Senate version of the Tax Act (which
was later adopted by the Conference Committee), gave partnerships
the same treatment for capitalized organization expenses that corpo-
rations have under section 248.53 Therefore, provisions similar to sec-
approach as opposed to pre-1954 treatment. Cagle v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 86,
94-95 (1974).
47. Rev. Rul. 75-214, 1975-1 C.B. 185.
48. I.R.C. § 162(a) (CCH 1985) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business .... ").
49. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (CCH 1985) ("No deduction shall be allowed for-(1) Any
amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or better-
ments made to increase the value of any property or estate.").
50. See supra note 40.
51. I.R.C. § 707(c) (CCH 1985) currently provides:
(c) GUARANTEED PAYMENTS.- To the extent determined without
regard to the income of the partnership, payments to a partner for serv-
ices or the use of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a
member of the partnership, but only for the purposes of section 61(a)
(relating to gross income) and, subject to section 263, for purposes of sec-
tion 162(a) (relating to trade or business expenses).
Compare prior version of I.R.C. § 707(c) (1970), supra note 43.
52. H. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120-22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3015-17; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-95, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3528-31.
53. I.R.C. § 248 (CCH 1985) provides in part:
(a) ELECTION TO AMORTIZE.- The organizational expenditures of a
corporation may, at the election of the corporation (made in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary), be treated as deferred ex-
penses. In computing taxable income, such deferred expenses shall be
allowed as a deduction ratably over such period of not less than 60
months as may be selected by the corporation (beginning with the month
in which the corporation begins business).
[Vol. 65:385
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tion 248 were added to the Senate Bill that provided for amortization
of organization expenses over a period not less than sixty months.
IV. SECTION 709 REGULATIONS
Regulations for section 709 were proposed by the Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service (Commissioner) in January, 1980, and
adopted in May, 1983.54
Generally, the regulations provide that the partnership may amor-
tize organization expenses over a period of not less than sixty months,
with the period of amortization beginning the month the partnership
commences business.55 Commencement of business is a question of
fact to be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.56
For most purposes, business is considered to commence when opera-
tions begin. If there is a doubt as to the date of commencement of the
business, the regulations provide several guidelines.57 The partner-
(b) ORGANIZATIONAL EXPENDITURES DEFINED.- The term "or-
ganizational expenditures" means any expenditure which -
(1) is incident to the creation of the corporation;
(2) is chargeable to capital account; and
(3) is of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a cor-
poration having a limited life, would be amortizable over such life.
54. The regulations were proposed on Jan. 11, 1980, and adopted on May 3, 1983, by
T.D. 7891, 1983-1 C.B. 117.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-1(b) (1983). See also LTR 8502002. The taxpayer sought ad-
vice as to whether his calculation of amortization is proper under § 709(b). The
taxpayer conceeded the amortization base included $47,100 of syndication ex-
penses. The Service stated excess amortization deducted by the taxpayer for
amounts that were actually syndication expenses cannot be offset against tax-
payer's amortization deduction allowable in the current year. There was stated to
be no authority for such an adjustment. Rather, the Service stated, the taxable
year's return cannot be adjusted to account for errors that occurred in prior
years.
56. Id. at § 1.709-2(c).
57. Id. The regulations state that the signing of the partnership agreement does not
evidence the commencement of business for § 709 purposes, but the purchase of
operating assets, however, may constitute the commencement of business. Id.
Operating assets are those assets that can be placed in service within a reasonable
time from acquisition. Id.
The issue of when business begins has been examined by several courts. Gen-
erally, the Service argues that real estate ownership entities are not engaged in
carrying on a trade or business until such time as the entity has begun to function
as a going concern, and is performing the activities for which it was organized.
Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rich-
mond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). The Service's administrative and
ruling position is that a partnership or corporation does not begin carrying on a
real estate trade or business until the purchase of the real estate has been com-
pleted, all necessary operating and occupancy permits have been issued, and the
real estate begins producing income. LTR 7842007 (1978). A commentator has
stated that two elements must be present to constitute commencement of busi-
ness: (1) the activities of the taxpayer must constitute a regular, continuous
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ship must elect to amortize and must choose its amortization period.
course of conduct; and (2) the taxpayer must have a good faith expectation of
profit. Lane, Pre-Opening Expenditures: Organizational and Syndication Costs,
Construction Period Interest and Taxes, and Loan Acquisition Costs, 42 INST. ON
FED. TAX'N § 21.01(2)(b) (1984).
Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 879-81 (Ct. Cl. 1982), provided a more
liberal test of when business commences. In Blitzer, closing occurred in Oct.,
1973, and the buildings were completed and ready for occupancy in 1974. The
court held that a trade or business commenced upon closing because land and
financing plans for construction were present. The court stated that the Commis-
sioner's position that an entity must be income producing in order to utilize
§ 162(a) was too rigid. The court noted that the partnership was at all times en-
gaged in endeavors for business or profit-making purposes, rather than for per-
sonal reasons. The court also stated that § 162 does not require a precise
matching of income and expenses in the same year. The court pointed out that
the Commissioner had not supplied an argument justifying why non-start up
costs should not be deductible as ordinary business expenses, irrespective of
whether the business has yet completed construction or acquisition of its income
producing asset.
Recent cases show the current unsettled nature of this area. In Ditunno v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362 (1983), the Tax Court adopted a facts-and-circum-
stances test to determine when a taxpayer was in a trade or business. The facts-
and-circumstances test was followed in Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.
538, 540 (1983). Hoopengarner involved the deduction of ground lease rents prior
to the completion and occupancy of a building which was to be built on the land.
The court stated that the payments were not for the purpose of a trade or busi-
ness as required by § 162(a)(3). The acquisition of land and the securing of ten-
ants were not events of a sufficient magnitude to place the petitioner in the office
building rental trade or business. However, the court did allow a portion of the
rental payments to be deducted under § 212(2) because they were expenses paid
for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the pro-
duction of income. Section 212 does not have a trade or business requirement.
The facts-and-circumstances test was also applied in Gajewski v. Commis-
sioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 967 (1983). In Gajewski, the court held that a gambler's
full time gambling activities met the trade or business test. This decision was
reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723
F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983). The circuit court stated that three conditions must exist
for trade or business status:
(1) The taxpayer must be regularly and actively engaged in the activity;
(2) The activity must be undertaken with an expectation of profit, and;
(3) The taxpayer must hold himself out to others as engaged in the sell-
ing of goods and services.
Id at 1065. The court criticized the Ditunno decision, contending that the facts-
and-circumstances test was not a standard, but rather a predicate to the determi-
nation of whether the trade or business criteria are present. The facts and cir-
cumstances are not the criteria. Instead, it is the marketing of goods and services
that is the standard for determining if expenses are incurred in a trade or busi-
ness.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94, 98 Stat. 615, has
affected the trade or business interpretation of § 212 adopted in Hoopengarner.
The new law makes it clear that expenses for the production of income incurred
prior to business activity must also be capitalized. The 1984 Tax Act amendments
to § 195 were directed at Hoopengarner's interpretation of § 212, and its applica-
bility if an entity has not yet commenced its trade or business.
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The election is irrevocable, and the period of amortization may not be
altered.58 A section 709 election is made by attaching a statement to
the partnership's first tax return.5 9
In the event the partnership should cease conducting business
prior to the conclusion of its amortization period, the regulations pro-
vide that the partners would be allowed a deduction under section 165
for the unamortized balance.60 At dissolution, the regulations provide
no deduction for capitalized syndication expenses.61
Organization expenses are defined as expenses that are: (1) inci-
dent to the creation of the partnership; (2) chargeable to a capital ac-
count; and (3) without value that would survive the termination of the
partnership.62 The regulations provide that all three requirements
must be met in order to qualify as a section 709 organization expense.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-1(b)(1) (1983).
59. Id. at § 1.709-1(c). The form prescribed for the statement of election is as follows:
Organization Whether or
Expenses Listed Amount Date Incurred Not Paid 2
$
1. Expenses less than $10 need not be separately listed. A total amount and the
date on which the first and last expenditure occurred, must be provided.
2. If the partnership is on a cash basis, the statement must also note if the pay-
ment was made prior to year end.
An amended return may be filed to include organizational expenses not in-
cluded in the original statement. Id.
60. Id. at § 1.709-1(b)(2). Section 709(b), read literally, provides that if the partner-
ship is liquidated before the end of such 60 month period, such deferred expenses
may be deducted under section 165. The § 165 deduction is not limited solely to
taxpayers electing to amortize over 60 months. Id. at § 1.709-1(b)(2); LTR
8217013.
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.709-1(b)(2) (1983). However, to the extent the partners con-
tributed funds to cover these costs, the contributions are reflected in the partner's
higher basis in their partnership interests. On liquidation, a loss or reduction in
gain may result in a tax benefit for the partner because of these syndication costs.
One commentator has stated that the tax benefit received by the partners may be
a capital loss. Leder, Guaranteed Payments, Management, and Promoter Fees, 41
INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 14.11 n.72 (1983). Another commentator has stated that
unamortized organization costs should be deductible as an ordinary loss on termi-
nation of the partnership (provided the partnership is not reorganized). This
would be consistent with corporate law. Larason, May Partnership Syndication
Costs Be Written Off Over a Limited Partnership's Life?, 58 J. TAX'N 336, 338
(1983).
In a corporate tax case, Malta Temple Ass'n v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 409
(1929), the court held that upon dissolution and surrender of its corporate
franchise, the petitioner lost a corporate asset (organizational expenses), "no part
of which had been returned to it through exhaustion deductions or as ordinary
and necessary expense deductions." Id. at 411. Furthermore, the loss was deduct-
ible. The Commissioner has acquiesced in the Malta Temple decision. XIII-2 CB
12 (1934).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(a) (1983).
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The first requirement would allow for deduction of expenses resulting
from the creation of the partnership63 if the expenses were incurred a
reasonable period of time before the partnership begins business, or
before the filing of the partnership's first return.64 To qualify under
the third requirement, the expense must be for an item of a nature
normally expected to benefit the partnership throughout its entire
life.65
Expenses that would qualify as organization expenses under sec-
tion 709 include legal fees, accounting fees, and filing fees incident to
the organization of the partnership.6 6 Those expenses would include
professional fees for negotiation and preparation of the partnership
agreement. The regulations also list expenses that would not qualify
as organization expenses. Those expenses include:
(1) expenses of acquiring or transferring assets;
(2) expenses of admission or removal of partners, other than when the part-
nership is first organized;
(3) expenses of negotiating and signing a contract, if the contract relates to
the operation of the partnership business (even where the contract is between
the partnership and one of its members), and;
(4) syndication expenses.6 7
For purposes of section 709, syndication expenses are defined as
expenses connected with the issuing or marketing of partnership in-
terest.68 Examples of syndication expenses would include broker's
fees, registration fees, costs associated with the prospectus, and pro-
motional materials. 69 As stated previously, section 709(a) denies cur-
rent deductibility for syndication expenses. The regulations
specifically state that syndication fees are not subject to section 709(b)
amortization and must be capitalized by the partnership.70
63. The expenses must be for the creation of the partnership and not for the opera-
tion or the starting of the operation of the partnership trade or business. I&
64. See generally Leder, supra note 61, at 14-30. This could pose problems for part-
nerships formed late in the year when all organization expenses have not yet
been incurred by year's end. One example would be legal fees in connection with
the filing of a certificate of limited partnership. This expense may not qualify for
the § 709(b)(1) amortization if incurred after the end of the first tax year.
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(a) (1983).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. I& at § 1.709-2(b).
69. Id. One commentator has suggested a test for determining what constitutes a
syndication expense for tax advice. Leder advocates a "but for" test. Syndication
expenses should include fees for tax advice only to the extent such fees are
greater than they would have been had there been no formal syndication. See
Leder, supra note 61, at 14-31. See also infra Part VI.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(b) (1983). For arguments on potential deductibility, see in-
fra note 98.
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V. SECTION 709 CASE LAW
A. Post-709, Pre-effective Date
The first post-709 case was Kimmelman v. Commissioner.71 In
Kimmelman, the petitioner was a limited partner in five limited part-
nerships that invested in real estate improved by unprofitable vine-
yards. The partnerships held the land for resale, and rented the
vineyards. The partnerships were charged a general partner fee72
equal to 10 percent of the purchase price, and a yearly management
fee of 1 percent of the purchase price.
The Tax Court, citing Cagle, held that expenses incurred incident
to the organization and syndication of a partnership are capital in na-
ture, and therefore not currently deductible.73 The court then noted
that the section 709(b) election to amortize was not available.
In arriving at its decision, the court stated that the entity approach
to partnerships adopted by Congress in the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code,74 and the court in Cagle, was consistent with the court's current
holding that guarantee payments to partners for performing services
that were capital in nature are non-deductible. Expenditures relating
to the acquisition of an asset that has a useful life greater than one
year are capital in nature and are not deductible as business ex-
penses.75 The court concluded that the management fee must be capi-
talized because the 10 percent fee included costs of organization and
syndication.76
71. 72 T.C. 294 (1979).
72. Services provided by the general partner included negotiating the purchase price,
retaining a civil engineer to survey and search title, having a title insurance com-
pany insure the title, retaining an accounting firm to set up the books, retaining a
bank to set up a deed of trust, and retaining an escrow agent to handle the
purchase. Each individual was paid for his/her services. Id. at 297-98.
73. Id. at 303-04.
74. See I.R.C. § 706(a) (CCH 1985).
75. Kimmelman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 294, 304 (1979) (citing Cagle v. Commis-
sioner, 63 T.C. 86 (1974), affd., 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976)).
76. Id at 306. The petitioners could not substantiate their claim that the manage-
ment fee was paid for services rendered other than organization or syndication.
The court found the petitioners' evidence vague as to the services performed. Pe-
titioners also made an argument that these fees were deductible under § 212. The
court stated that § 212 does not enlarge the range of allowable deductions vis-a-vis
§ 263, but merely enlarges the category of income with reference to which ex-
penses were deductible. Id. at 306 n.4 (citing McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S.
57, 62 (1944)). Capital expenditures were held to be non-deductible under § 212.
In Huber v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 57 (1984), the Tax Court relied
on Kimmelman in reaching its decision on the deductibility of an up-front man-
agement fee. The partnership in question was formed to buy farms in sub-stan-
dard condition, make improvements, and then operate or lease the farms until
they could be sold at a profit. A management fee equal to 10 percent of the
purchase price was paid on the date the agreement to purchase a farm was exe-
cuted. Services included in the management fee included evaluation of the prop-
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In Wendland v. Commissioner,7 7 the Tax Court discussed section
709 extensively, even though the amortization provisions of section
709(b) did not apply because the tax years in question were prior to
the effective date of the section.78 Wendland involved a limited part-
nership formed to acquire an ongoing coal mine. The partnership in-
curred extensive legal fees in its formation, which were then passed
through to the partners and deducted pro rata.79
The issue before the Tax Court was whether the legal fees in ques-
tion were ordinary and necessary expenses that would be currently
deductible, as advanced by the petitioner, or whether the legal fees
were organization expenses, and therefore had to be capitalized, as
contended by the Commissioner. The court stated that legal fees re-
lating to the organization and sale of partnership interests are not cur-
rently deductible. The nature of the services performed must be
examined to determine whether the expenditure is ordinary or neces-
sary, or capital.0
The court held that Congress intended section 709 to parallel sec-
tions 248 and 263, and for that reason, "the portion of the fee attributa-
ble to legal advice must be capitalized."' 1 In reaching its decision, the
court stated no opinion as to whether tax advice is deductible under
section 212(3),82 or whether section 709 overrides section 212(3) with
respect to tax advice. The court did state, however, that it did not
have enough evidence before it to determine whether section 212(3)
was applicable because petitioner had not distinguished legal advice
from tax advice in the services it received.8 3
The courts that examined situations dealing with the organization
erty, appraisal, engineering assessment, negotiation of the sales price, drafting of
contracts, and drafting of the partnership agreement.
The court stated that § 162(a) must be satisfied in order for the expense to be
deductible by the partnership. Deductibility under § 162(a) depends on the na-
ture of the services performed rather than the designation or treatment of the
expense by the partnership. Id. at 60. The court determined that a large portion
of the management fee went towards selecting farms to be purchased, contacting
limited partners, and setting up the partnerships. As such, these expenses were
characterized as organization and syndication expenses, and they were treated as
non-deductible capital expenses. Id. The expenses in question were incurred
from 1974-76, therefore § 709(b) amortization was unavailable.
77. 79 T.C. 355 (1982).
78. Id. at 387 n.19.
79. The lawyer prepared the confidential offering memo, obtained geological infor-
mation, rendered a tax opinion, and prepared income and expense projections.
Id. at 388.
80. The petitioner has the burden of proving that the fee accrued by the partnership
is currently deductible. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 142(a). See generally Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
81. Wendland v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 355, 388-89 (1982). See also infra Part VI.
82. Wendland v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 355, 389 (1982).
83. Id.
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of partnerships, as previously noted, followed the proscription of sec-
tion 709, and declared organization and syndication expenses to be
non-deductible capital expenditures.
A major case, which has been seen as retreating from some of the
section 709 requirements, was decided by the Court of Claims in 1982.
Blitzer v. United States,8 4 dealt with a suit for refund of taxes. A part-
nership was formed to construct and operate a housing project. The
land was purchased in 1971, loan commitments and investors were se-
cured by 1973, and construction was completed in 1974. At issue was
the deductibility of the petitioner's share of losses attributable to fees
claimed to have been paid to the construction mortgagee and the ad-
ministrative general partner.
Focusing on the deductibility of organization and syndication ex-
penses, the court examined several transactions of the partnership.
The construction mortgagee charged the partnership, by deducting
from the loan proceeds, an initial service charge and a federal mort-
gage commitment fee it had paid. The petitioner claimed that this
amount was totally deductible because it was additional interest.8 5
Respondent argued that such a charge was a reimbursement to the
mortgagee for services performed, and should be deductible over the
life of the loan.
The court determined that there was no correlation between the
bank's services and the fee it charged. The court determined the fee
to be an additional charge for the use of the money, and therefore
deductible under section 163.86 However, the court went on to state
that a cash basis taxpayer who gives a promissory note for interest
does not thereby become entitled to a deduction for interest paid pur-
suant to section 163.87 The court determined the federal loan commit-
ment fee was not interest, but rather a cost involved in obtaining a
loan that must be amortized over the life of the note.88 The court con-
cluded that the commitment fee benefited both the lender and the
borrower, thereby refuting the mortgagee's contention that it was a
84. 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
85. Cleaver v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1946), cert denied, 330 U.S. 849
(1946).
86. Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 882 (Ct. Cl. 1982). See also Wilkerson v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 240 (1978), rev'd, 655 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1981). But see
Gaines v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 363 (1982) (guaranteed payments held
not deductible even though included in recipient's income); Goodwin v. Commis-
sioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980) (bank loan fees held not deductible, requiring fees to be
capitalized over the lives of the associated loans); Lane, supra note 57, § 21.05 at
21-21 (real property construction-period interest and taxes capitalized under
I.R.C. § 189(c)(1)).
87. Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 883-84 (Ct. C1. 1982). See aso Battlestein v.
Internal Revenue Serv., 631 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 938
(1981).
88. Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 890 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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"mere conduit."8 9
The court disallowed a deduction for the partner's proportionate
share of the administrative general partner's fee.9 0 The court stated
that limited partnerships should be afforded the same treatment as
corporations when dealing with issues of organization, issuance of
stock, and acquisition of assets.91 For corporations, these expenses
have long been held to be non-deductible, capital expenses. 92 Citing
Woodward v. Commissioner,93 the court stated that capital expendi-
tures are not limited to the actual costs of the assets, but also include
legal, brokerage, accounting, and other ancillary expenses incurred in
acquiring a capital asset.94 In its most controversial holding, the court
held that services ancillary to forming the partnership95 and syndi-
cating its shares should be amortized over the fifty year life of the
partnership.96 This holding has been followed in one case, 97 and has
prompted a debate among commentators.9 8
89. Id. The lender could only assure repayment at face value if it received the Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association commitment. Also, the lender had the option
of keeping the loan if it was profitable or selling the note at a premium.
90. Id at 893. The role of the administrative general partner was summarized as
"looking out for the interests of the limited partners and doing everything it can
do to see that the partnership is managed properly and effectively, remains via-
ble, and does not default .. " Id. at 890. Services performed by the general
partner included the conducting of a feasibility study, preparation of partnership
documents, retaining a Certified Public Accountant, selection of a management
company, making progress reports on construction, marketing units and suprevis-
ing operations. Id.
91. Id. at 893 (citing Kimmelman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 294 (1979); Cagle v. Com-
missioner, 63 T.C. 86 (1974), aff'd, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976); Meldrum & Few-
smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. '790 (1952)).
92. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974). The Court stated that § 263
took priority over § 151: "The clear import of § 161 is that, with stated exceptions
.... an expenditure incurred in acquiring capital assets must be capitalized even
when the expenditure otherwise might be deemed deductible under Part VI." Id.
at 17.
93. 397 U.S. 572, 576-77 (1970).
94. Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 893 (Ct. Cl. 1982). See also Estate of Boyd v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 646 (1981). Boyd involved expenses incurred in the organi-
zation of an oil and gas partnership. The petitioner claimed that expenses in-
volved in the evaluation of oil properties that ultimately were not acquired were
deductible. The court held them to be non-deductible, capital expenses because
the partnership was in the business of producing oil, not locating and buying
properties.
95. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a) to 10(b) (1960).
96. Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 893 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
97. Sartin v. United States, 5 Ct. C1. 172, 179 (1984). The Claims Court stated that it
was bound by Blitzer, and had no authority to overrule it. The tax year in ques-
tion in Sartin was 1975.
98. Larason, supra note 61, advances several theories to support his conclusion that
syndication costs should be amortized. He first argues that § 709 has language
similar to § 263(a) ("no deduction shall be allowed"), but that § 263(a) has never
been interpreted to deny depreciation or amortization. Larason further states
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Taxpayer interest in the Blitzer ruling, and its later acceptance by
the court in Sartin v. United States,99 must be tempered for two rea-
sons. Both Blitzer and Sartin involved refund claims for years prior to
1976. It is unclear what effect the Claims Court would give section 709
if faced with a post-1976 syndication fee deduction, in light of its
Blitzer and Sartin decisions. Also, the partnership involved in Blitzer
had a limited life of fifty years. There is no clue given in Blitzer as to
how partnerships with unlimited lives are to be treated. A recent Tax
Court case and Revenue Ruling have rejected the Blitzer and Sartin
approach to the treatment of syndication expenses.100 At present, the
Blitzer and Sartin decisions thus seem to be restricted to the Claims
Court for the benefit of taxpayers who can afford to pay the tax in
question and then sue for a refund.
The period of time between Cagle in 1974, and Blitzer in 1982, saw
major developments occur with respect to the deductibility of partner-
ship organization and syndication expenses. Not only was section 709
enacted and regulations thereunder promulgated, but also a number
of cases were decided with relation to organization and syndication ex-
penses. Thus, the scarce case law of the 1950's and 1960's was compen-
sated for by a two-pronged attack of legislation and case law in the
1970's and early 1980's.
B. Post-709, Post-effective Date
The final area to be examined is how the Service and courts have
dealt with section 709 issues subsequent to the effective date of the
legislation. The cases examined in the prior section all recognized the
existence of section 709, but were not bound by it because the issues in
question related to taxable years prior to the effective date of section
709. This section of the Article will analyze the post-effective date sec-
tion 709 decisions and lay the foundation for planning considerations
in section 709 situations.
Revenue Rule 81-1531o1 was the first post-section 709 ruling di-
rected at organization and syndication expenses. The Ruling involved
a tax advisor who entered into an agreement with a promoter to sell
that since Blitzer is based on § 263 and Cagle, and since § 709 was stated to codify
those principles, the Blitzer decision would support the proposition that § 709
does not preclude amortization of syndication expenses.
A subsequent article, McGuire, Can the Syndication Costs of a Partnership be
Amortized? An Analysis ofAuthorities, 59 J. TAx'N 208 (1983), refutes Larason's
theory. McGuire states that it is clear based on treatment of corporations and
prior partnership cases that amortization of syndication costs is prohibited by
§ 709. He states that even without § 709, case law has provided that the cost of
acquiring capital is non-amortizable.
99. 5 Ct. Cl. 172 (1984).
100. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
101. 1981-1 C.B. 387.
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partnership interests to his clients. The promoter offered to pay an 8
percent "rebate" to the tax advisor's clients if any of his clients in-
vested.102 In return the tax advisor agreed not to bill any clients who
did not invest. The rebate was not offered to non-clients. The part-
nership's prospectus represented that such a payment would be de-
ductible under section 212.
The Service ruled that the payments were, in fact, payments made
by the promoter to the tax advisor, with the client merely acting as a
conduit. As such, the payment made in compensation for tax services
is considered to be made by the promoter, and it is not deductible by
the client/investor. The Service considered the expenses involved to
be obligations of the partnership, and not of the investor.
The payments were held to be non-deductible by the partnership
under section 709 because the payment was in substance a commission
for the sale of a partnership interest. The tax advisor's services re-
lated solely to the sale of the interests and not to the organization of
the partnership. A similar result would occur if the partnership had
deducted the rebate from the purchase price and paid the tax advisor
itself.
In Cornutt v. Commissioner,O3 a CPA incurred transportation and
other expenses while soliciting clients of the firm he worked for in
order to determine whether or not they would retain him if he opened
his own firm. The Commissioner disallowed the deductions, arguing
that because they were incurred in the establishment of a new trade or
business, they should be capitalized. 0 4
The court disagreed with the Commissioner's argument that sec-
tion 709 should apply. It held that the expenses were not incident to
the creation of a partnership, but instead were incurred to determine
potential client base without regard to the form of entity used. Since
no assets were acquired, the expenses were not of a nature requiring
capitalization. 105
In Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner,l06 peti-
102. In a typical situation, a client would invest and receive a bill from the tax advisor
for tax advice. The client would then receive the "rebate" from the promoter.
This rebate would then be used by the client to pay the bill from the tax advisor.
103. 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 515 (1983).
104. Id at 517.
105. Id The fact that the petitioner ultimately formed a partnership was held by the
court to be of no consequence. The court, however, should have found that these
expenses were incident to the creation of a partnership because the petitioner
chose to operate his new business as a partnership based on the information his
survey collected. This type of expense should be classified as a § 195 start-up cost.
Start-up expenses are defined as amounts paid or incurred in creating or investi-
gating the creation or acquisition of an active trade or business. This definition
would seem to characterize the expenses incurred in Cornutt.
106. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 305 (1982).
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tioner was a corporation engaged in contract drilling of oil and gas
wells and related services. The president of petitioner was also the
chief executive of the general partner in a number of oil and gas lim-
ited partnerships. To procure financing, selling agents corresponded
with the general partner concerning the sale of partnership interests.
After securing an investor, the selling agent remitted the investment
to the general partner. The petitioner was then to pay the selling
agent a commission of not greater than 10 percent of the amount in-
vested from its corporate account. There were no express agreements
between the petitioner and the general partner as to commissions, but
there was an agreement between the president of petitioner and the
selling agents whereby petitioner would pay the commissions.
The petitioner contended that the commissions were an ordinary
and necessary expense because securing investors was necessary in or-
der to insure that petitioner would receive drilling contracts. The
court stated that the commissions were in essence syndication fees of
the partnership and as such were non-deductible capital expenses.
The court was unwilling to convert an otherwise non-deductible ex-
pense into a deductible expense by virtue of an individual's dominance
over other related entities such that he is able to cause another entity
to make the expenditure.107
In Surloff v. Commissioner,108 the petitioners were partners in a
limited partnership formed to mine coal in Kentucky and Tennessee.
The partnership agreement provided that cash contributions of the
partners would apply primarily to the general partner commencement
fee, attorney's fees, offeree-representative fees, and advance royalties.
The Tax Court determined that the partnership was not engaged in
a trade or business. Payments to the general partners were therefore
non-deductible under section 162(a).109 Because the payments were
non-deductible under section 162(a), the court stated that there was no
need to determine their status under section 709.110
The offeree-representative was required to assist each partner in
the evaluation of the relative risk of investing in the partnership. If
there was a decision to invest, the offeree-representative received 10
percent of the amount invested. The court held that this expenditure
must be capitalized because the services were rendered to the partners
rather than to the partnership. For that reason, they were not ordi-
nary and necessary expenses of the partnership.
In addition, the court held that tax advice is non-deductible when
used solely as an aid in selling partnership interests. The attorneys
had prepared tax opinion letters and met with the potential investors
107. Id at 308.
108. 81 T.C. 210 (1983).
109. Id at 240 n.63.
110. Id at 243-44.
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and the offeree-representatives to explain the financial and tax impli-
cations of the investment. The court held that these expenses facili-
tated the sale of partnership interests, and therefore, they must be
capitalized.1-1
A recent Tax Court case and Revenue Ruling have cast considera-
ble doubt on the viability of the Blitzer decision on the subject of
amortization of syndication expenses. In Estate of Thomas v. Commis-
sioner,112 the petitioner amortized the general partner's commission
over the nine year life of the partnership. The partnership in question
was formed to acquire computer central processing units and related
equipment, to lease or sell the equipment to others, and to perform
any acts necessary to accomplish those purposes.
The Tax Court recognized that the question of the proper treat-
ment of the capitalized costs was a case of first impression before the
court. The petitioner contended that the partnership should be per-
mitted to deduct the capitalized costs annually over the partnership's
life. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that amortization
was inappropriate and that recovery should only be allowed upon liq-
uidation of the partnership. 1 3
The court looked to the treatment of corporations in determining
that partnership syndication costs may not be amortized.114 In reach-
ing its decision, the court noted that fees paid by corporations in con-
nection with stock issues (such as broker's commissions) have
historically been treated as a reduction of capital, and accordingly
have been held to be non-amortizable.115 The court also examined the
legislative history of section 248 and section 709 regarding syndication
expenses. The court noted that Congress recognized when drafting
111. Id at 245-46. In Flowers v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 914 (1983), the petitioners
claimed a deduction for tax advice. The court noted that a large portion, if not
the entire amount of the expense, was incurred for purposes of obtaining the tax
opinion letter which accompanied the prospectus. Quoting § 709, the court held
that since the petitioners failed to prove that the tax advice was incurred for a
purpose other than to promote the sale of an interest in the partnership, it was
not deductible. Id. at 943.
112. 84 T.C. 412 (1985).
113. Id. at 441.
114. The court stated: "'[A] commission is a capital expenditure to be charged against
the proceeds of the stock, not recovered from operating earnings. It merely
reduces the net returns from the sale of the stock and reduces the available capi-
tal. It has no relation to operating expenses.'" Id. at 441-42 (quoting Barbour
Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 163, 164 (10th Cir. 1934), cert denied, 295 U.S.
731 (1935)).
The court also stated that "[ain argument might be made that these expenses
are similar to loan costs, which are capitalized and deducted pro-rata over the life
of the loan .... While this theory might be persuasive if we were writing on a
clean slate, we cannot overlook the fact that the law in the corporate context-
which clearly provides a closer analogy-is to the contrary." Id. at 442 n.53.
115. Id. at 442.
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both sections that the amortization that was provided for organization
expenses was not available for syndication expenses.11 6
Addressing the Court of Claims decision in Blitzer, the court in Es-
tate of Thomas stated that it "[did] not feel compelled to follow [the]
ruling. . ,,117 The court stated that in Blitzer, the Commissioner
conceded that amortization over the fifty year life of the partnership
was called for in that case. Thus, the Court of Claims did not address
the issue of the amortization of syndication expenses in an adversarial
manner. The court instead reached a conclusion argued for by the
Commissioner in the alternative.11s
The Service has also recently promulgated a Revenue Ruling on
the issue of whether a partnership can amortize syndication expenses
incurred in connection with the sale of limited partnership interests.
Revenue Ruling 85-32119 involved a promoter who amortized the cost
of printing the prospectus for his hotel limited partnership. After
briefly reciting the applicable code and regulation sections, the Service
stated that the cost of printing a prospectus is a syndication expense
that is not eligible for amortization under section 709(b). Section
709(b) was held to supersede any other section with respect to the de-
ductibility of the cost of a prospectus. Therefore, the Service held that
syndication costs are expenses chargeable by the partnership against
the capital account, and are thus non-amortizable.
The decisions dealing with section 709 have not addressed all the
relevant issues. Several areas have been addressed, as evidenced by
the cases cited in this section, but some still remain open for discus-
sion. These areas of current controversy will be the next topic of
discussion.
VI. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
When faced with the organization of a partnership, a tax planner
must address several key issues. The first of these is how attorneys or
CPAs should keep records of their time. In any action concerning the
deductibility or non-deductibility of an expense, the petitioner carries
the burden of proving current deductibility.120 A number of attorneys
or CPAs will work on both partnership formation and the selling of
partnership interests. Because the treatment of these expenses is dif-
ferent under section 709, care should be exercised in properly docu-
menting the time spent for both functions. The authors of one treatise
even advocate the submission of separate billing statements for work
116. Id at 442-43.
117. Id- at 444.
118. I&
119. 1985-12 I.R.B. 6.
120. Supra note 80.
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related to organization and work related to syndication.121
Several recent cases have shown the danger of a lump sum state-
ment for professional services.122 One of these cases, Wildman v.
Commissioner,123 illustrates the necessity of proper documentation of
time. Petitioner was a limited partner in a partnership formed to ac-
quire and distribute a movie. A lump sum statement for legal fees was
given to the partnership by its attorneys. The statement listed the
services performed, 24 but gave no breakdown as to time allocated for
each. The Tax Court concluded that since no substantiated basis for
the value of the services performed was provided, it could not allocate
between deductible and non-deductible services. As a result, the en-
tire amount of the legal fees was required to be capitalized.125
121. PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, supra note 19, § 21.01 at 21-5 to 6.
122. Johnsen v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 103 (1984); Huber v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M.
(CCH) 57 (1984); Flowers v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 914 (1983); Wildman v. Com-
missioner, 78 T.C. 943 (1982).
123. 78 T.C. 943 (1982).
124. The services performed included tax planning for the structuring of the partner-
ship, drafting the partnership agreement, acquiring the movie, reviewing the dis-
tribution agreement, and soliciting and screening limited partners. Id. at 960.
125. Id. at 961. The petitioners relied on the testimony of one of the law firm's part-
ners. The court stated that the testimony provided little more than a description
of the work done, and it did not provide a clue as to the time spent on each ser-
vice.
In Johnsen v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 103, 126-29 (1984), one item of contro-
versy was a limited partnership that incurred legal fees and consulting and advi-
sory fees prior to construction of the apartment complex that the partnership was
formed to construct. The court held that the partners could not deduct any of the
fees because of their failure to prove that any portion of the fees were deductible.
The partnership incurred the expenses at issue in 1976; therefore, § 709(a) ap-
plied, but § 709(b) amortization was unavailable.
The partnership paid $10,000 for legal advice, $7,500 of which was deducted as
tax advice. The law firm submitted an unitemized bill for its services. No mem-
ber of the firm testified at the trial. The petitioner requested that the court apply
the rule of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) (where portion of
deductible expenses undocumented, still "unfair, wrong, and inconsistent" to dis-
allow entire amount), in order to determine the deductible portion of the legal
fees.
The court stated that in order to make a Cohan estimate, the court must be
convinced from the record that the limited partnership incurred expenses for de-
ductible tax advice in at least the amount allowed in such estimate; absent that
assurance, "relief to the taxpayer would be unguided largesse." Johnsen v. Com-
missioner, 83 T.C. 103, 127 (1984). The court was unsure what portion of the fee
went to tax advice and which portion went to organization advice. In addition,
evidence was received that indicated that the tax advice may have primarily been
for preparation of a tax opinion letter that was non-deductible under Surloff v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210 (1983). The court, therefore, applied the rule in Wend-
land v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 355 (1982), and held that none of the fees were
deductible.
Fees were paid to an investment consulting firm for selling and organization
expenses as well as tax advice. The firm was made up of several of the general
partners of the partnership. The partnership allocated 60 percent of the fee, or
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A similar type of holding was reached in Wildman with relation to
up-front management fees. Because payments to general partners are
subject to section 709, whether coming under section 707(a) or section
707(b), it is important to ensure that portions of this payment are allo-
cated to services performed in a reasonable manner. In Wildman, the
partnership paid the general partner a lump sum amount prior to re-
lease of the movie.12 6 The court held that since no details were pro-
vided as to the specifics of the services that the taxpayer contended
had been performed, the payment would be treated as a fee for putting
together a syndication. The court held this expense to be a non-de-
ductible, capital expense. Deductibility, stated the court, depended on
the nature of the services performed, rather than the designation
given those expenses by the partnership.127
The issue of the treatment of expenses for tax advice is one of con-
tinuing controversy. The court in Surloff stated that tax advice used
solely as an aid in selling partnership interests is non-deductible.
However, section 212(3)128 states that a current deduction is available
for expenses paid or incurred in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax. Finally, the regulations under section
709129 treat as syndication expenses the legal fees for advice relating to
the adequacy of tax disclosures in the prospectus and the placement
memorandum for securities law purposes. The language of the cur-
$37,500, to tax advice. Again, no itemized statements were put before the court,
and no tangible work product was submitted. The court had only the testimony
of one of the limited partners to go by. The partner stated that advice had been
given to the partnership regarding business alternatives in light of the require-
ments of the tax law.
The court stated that "[t]he meager record before [the court was] totally insuf-
ficient to sustain the allocation for which the petitioner contends." Johnsen v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 103, 128 (1984). Neither the amount of the fee nor its allo-
cation resulted from an arm's length transaction. Id The court, therefore, con-
cluded that none of the expense would be allocated to tax advice. Citing Flowers
v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 914 (1983), and Wendland v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 355
(1982), the court stated that where the petitioner totally fails to prove what por-
tion, if any, of the alleged tax advisory fees is deductible, a deduction is disallowed
for any portion of such fees. Johnsen v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 103, 129 (1984).
126. Services performed by the general partner included retaining of consultants,
marketing, negotiating the distribution agreement, liaison with attorneys, and re-
taining tax advisors.
127. Wildman v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 943, 959 (1982).
128. I.R.C. § 212 (CCH 1985). Section 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any
tax.
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-1(b) (1975).
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rent regulations is narrower in scope than that of the original regula-
tions proposed for section 709.130
It is within the above parameters that various commentators have
given planning ideas with relation to expenses for tax advice. Under
facts similar to Revenue Ruling 81-153, it is apparent that a section 212
deduction would have been available had the investor directly re-
tained the tax advisor to advise him on the tax implications of an in-
vestment in the partnership. One commentator has theorized that if
the tax advisor in Revenue Ruling 81-153 had refused a commission
from the promoter and then negotiated a decrease in cost for the in-
vestor, a subsequent arrangement with the investor for compensation
would appear to be for tax advice and not for marketing of the inter-
est.131 The key to avoiding Revenue Ruling 81-153 is for the investor
to avoid the appearance of being a mere "conduit" between the pro-
moter and the tax advisor. One way to assure this is to have the tax
advisor bill all potential investors for any tax advice rendered. Under
the facts of Revenue Ruling 81-153, the tax advisor received compensa-
tion only if the potential investor was a client, and then only when the
potential investor actually invested. When the tax advisor is compen-
sated only when the potential investor invests, a strong argument can
be raised that the amount paid is really a sales commission.
A similar situation to that in Revenue Ruling 81-153 received a
negative ruling by the Service in a Private Letter Ruling.13 2 The law
firm in question had a policy of evaluating 33 real estate partnerships,
and putting clients in touch with syndications if they found them to be
sound. The firm did not bill clients until they invested. The Private
Letter Ruling stated that section 212 must defer to section 263 in de-
termining deductibility. 134 In its rationale, the Service stated that the
law firm went beyond tax advice by actually seeking out and negotiat-
ing investment opportunities. The key issue, as seen by the Service,
was that the taxpayer did not receive personal tax advice on property
already identified, but in fact paid the law firm to pick out the asset
for them. Since the expenses originated within the process of acquisi-
tion, they were not deductible under section 212(3), and had to be
130. See Podlin and Mitrano, Are Professional Tax Fees of Newly Syndicated Partner-
ships Deductible, Amortizable or Nondeductible?, 14 TAX ADVISER 666 (1983).
131. See Leder, supra note 61, at 14-31 to 32.
132. LTR. 8108008.
133. The law firm policy was to modify the partnership agreement, if necessary, to
benefit the client. A set price was charged to the clients (total cost divided by the
number of investors) and a minimum fee was charged to clients who did not in-
vest. The law firm did not represent the client at the closing and no money was
funneled through the law firm. The law firm also monitored the clients after
investment. Occasionally, the law firm would represent the syndicators. Id.
134. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(e) (1975).
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capitalized.135
An argument exists that tax advice, such as advice regarding the
tax aspects of how the partnership will operate, projections or fore-
casts to help plan the operation, and overall tax considerations in
structuring a transaction, are not syndication expenses and are either
currently deductible36 or amortizable. 137 One commentator argues
that only tax advice that relates to securities law tax disclosures
should be capitalized as a syndication expense.138 Another commenta-
tor points to the language of the regulations defining syndication ex-
penses as possibly providing a loophole for deductibility of tax
advice.139 The regulations state that syndication expenses include:
"legal fees. . . for advice pertaining to the adequacy of tax disclosures
... ; [and] accounting fees for preparation of representations to be
included in the offering materials .... "140 This distinction may sug-
gest that legal fees that relate to preparation of tax services do not
constitute syndication fees. This conclusion, however, is highly sus-
pect in light of the Surloff decision.
The authors of a partnership taxation treatise have listed a number
of areas of tax advice that they believe could be deductible, even
though rendered in connection with the formation of a partnership. 141
Those areas include:
(1) whether it is desirable to retain property and rent to the partnership;
(2) tax advice relating to partner contributions;
(3) tax advice relating to the transfer of partner property to the partnership;
(4) application of section 465 at risk rules;
135. In Collins v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1656 (1970), the petitioner hired an attorney
to structure the purchase of an apartment. After the purchase was arranged, the
petitioner hired a CPA to secure the best possible tax treatment of the purchase.
The Court differentiated between the work done by the CPA and the work done
by the attorney. The test was said to be the intent of the person rendering the
services. The CPA's services were deductible because they were intended to se-
cure tax advantages. The lawyer's services were non-deductible because they re-
lated to the acquisition of property.
136. See I.R.C. § 212(3) (CCH 1985).
137. See id. at § 195 or id. at § 709(b).
138. Podlin and Mitrano, supra note 127.
139. Segal, Fees For Tax Opinions in Offering Documents: What Grounds for Deduct-
ibility?, 60 J. TAX'N 54 (1984).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(b) (1983) (emphasis added).
141. PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, supra note 19, at § 21.03. The authors state that simply
because an expense is for tax advice does not keep it from being capitalized. See
also Honodel v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 1462, 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Tax advice
directly related to a capital acquisition or disposition is an expense which must be
capitalized, just as are legal, brokerage, and other ancillary expenses.").
Whether § 709 overrides § 212(3) may well depend on a number of factors,
including whether the court treats the expenditure by the partnership as a
§ 212(3) expense of an individual, and the ability to establish the purpose of the
allocation. PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, supra note 19, at § 21.03.
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(5) special allocations. 1 4 2
The type of partnership will also influence planning in the area of
organization and syndication expenses. In a large publicly traded lim-
ited partnership, a vast majority of first year expenses will go towards
syndication. This result is to be expected because there is no doubt as
to what the initial expenses of a publicly traded syndication will con-
sist of.143 Private syndications may provide more opportunity for
planning.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although it has been law almost ten years, very few cases have
been specifically decided under section 709. Even the most recent
cases in the area involved tax years prior to 1977.144 In the future, the
area to watch will be syndication expenses. The regulations relating
to syndication expenses are meager in comparison to the organization
expense provisions under section 709.
One major question to be addressed is the treatment of capitalized
syndication costs upon liquidation of the partnership. The regulations
provide no deductibility,145 but this is inconsistent with corporate
treatment and the views of several commentators.146 Another area to
watch will be the continued discussion concerning what constitutes
tax advice for purposes of the regulations. The final area to be
watched will be the Court of Claims' response to Estate of Thomas.
An affirmance of the Blitzer ruling by the Court of Claims could set
the stage for a showdown on one of the most critical elements of sec-
tion 709.
William M. Ojile, Jr., '85
142. PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, supra note 19, at § 21.03.
143. Telephone interview with Gallen Hull, Vice-President of JMB Realty, Inc., Chi-
cago, Ill. (Apr. 3, 1985). Mr. Hull stated that JMB was not at all aggressive in how
its organization and syndication expenses were treated. He stated that the ex-
penses are examined for a partnership, and depending on the size and materiality
of the expenses involved, a scope is set. Any expense above that scope amount is
capitalized. Any expense below that amount is either amortized or deducted. Ex-
penses that are deducted are usually ancillary, overhead type expenses which
could not easily be segregated (i.e., secretarial expenses, telephone, copying).
144. See supra notes 76 & 125 and accompanying text.
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-1(b)(2) (1983).
146. See supra note 61.
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